On 6 August 2026, the Ethiopian government announced firm measures against corruption, illicit activities, and organised economic crimes that are reportedly undermining the country’s ongoing macroeconomic reform efforts. In a statement, the Government Communication Service said that organised actors had attempted to exploit financial and trade systems, contributing to foreign currency shortages, inflationary pressures, smuggling, and artificial scarcity of essential goods. To reinforce accountability, law enforcement bodies have carried out extensive operations across critical sectors.

According to the same statement, more than 7,000 businesses and warehouses implicated in illegal operations have been sealed, while action has been taken against entities involved in illicit financial transactions, black-market activity, fraud, cryptocurrency-related crimes, and tax evasion. In the gold trade, 183 individuals are facing legal proceedings over alleged smuggling and illegal trading, and more than 650 individuals, fuel stations, and companies have similarly been held accountable for participating in unauthorised fuel activities. Broader enforcement has also been directed at officials and individuals accused of corruption in fertiliser procurement, electricity supply, labour migration, and revenue administration.

The ongoing initiative by the Ethiopian government to combat corruption must be regarded as one of the key governance signals of the current political moment. Ethiopia is entering a new post-election period, and by stepping up investigations and law enforcement, the government should not treat the initiative as a mere low-enforcement move. It is rather a litmus test of whether public power can finally be disentangled from private enrichment.

In its analysis, Addis Standard has previously described corruption as a daily challenge that deprives citizens of basic public services. If the current effort is conducted objectively and institutionally, it might start to reinstate the idea of public office as a public trust instead of a business opportunity for its occupants. However, the importance of the initiative does not depend only on arrests but rather on its ability to change the behaviour of officials in public offices. The initiative should prove that official position, political connection, or influence should not shield anyone from public theft or abuse. Furthermore, what matters most is whether accountability is extended to regional, zonal, woreda, and grassroots institutions, particularly those located in the periphery and least developed regions.

In peripheral areas, corruption is not felt through outrage but through a lack of functioning service delivery. While a particular woreda may receive a large budget allocation for a water project, the boreholes are dry, stop working soon after completion, or do not benefit the community despite substantial public expenditure and inauguration. World Bank reporting indicates that roughly 60 million people still lack access to basic water supply. In such contexts, a failed borehole is not merely a technical failure; rather, it can further exacerbate displacement, poor health, poor education quality, and poverty.

The most meaningful indicator of progress should not be the number of arrests made or press releases issued, but the recovery of state property and public assets.”

The same issue can be found in health, education, and other infrastructure. A healthcare facility may be in the plan or open its doors without having the basic medical supplies, electricity, or qualified staff. Similarly, a school may be inaugurated without the required basic facilities, including classrooms, laboratories, learning materials, or teachers. Contracted development projects can therefore remain incomplete or unusable for years. Therefore, citizens have the right to understand why large budgets lead to underperformance.

When patronage replaces public administration

The problem usually starts at the initial project phase. The project can be jeopardised by an incomplete or inadequate feasibility study, poor design, lack of competition, fraudulent technical specifications, or poor supervision. A World Bank study of corruption risks in Ethiopia’s rural water sector identified risks ranging from favouritism in contract design to collusion, falsification, and procurement manipulation. World Bank sanctions proceedings have also documented corrupt procurement practices in Ethiopia, showing that these risks are not theoretical. The problem becomes more urgent when officials are reliant on informal political and social connections. In some peripheral areas, government officials face greater pressure from local patrons, business associates, elders, family networks, and political actors who helped secure the office appointment than from the public they are supposed to serve. However, such connections are not inherently corrupt, but when political survival is reliant on patronage, public decisions can become distorted by private obligations. Under certain circumstances, contracts, job offers, access to public offices, and administrative power can all serve as political currency.

For instance, contractors with political connections may tactfully secure informal assurance of selection even before a tender is announced; staff responsible for oversight may know that an underperformance report could carry both political and personal consequences. Thus, political networking and loyalty take precedence over performance. The end incentive is dangerous: collect as much private gain as possible from the privilege of public property access at the public’s expense.

Audit Without Action: Mere documentation

Ethiopia’s own audit record shows why stronger follow-up is essential. Addis Standard’s reporting on federal audit findings has emphasised illegal expenditures, outstanding accounts receivable, and construction works carried out in violation of procurement procedures. A separate Addis Standard analysis of fiscal mismanagement has cited weaknesses in expenditure control, problems in procurement, high costs, and delays in project implementation.

These findings could not be considered merely as an annual administrative formality but should trigger investigation, corrective action, and accountability.” Underperforming or failed projects should trigger a vivid chain of accountability: who should have approved the feasibility study? Who prepared the bid? Was competition objective? How was the selection process conducted? Who controlled project oversight and execution? Who approved completion? How did an underperforming contractor manage to win another contract?

From headlines to recovery

Consequently, the initiative must pivot away from a focus on detention and toward a rigorous, project-by-project audit of all endeavours that have failed, been entirely abandoned, experienced significant delays, or are performing well below expectations. Following these audits, decisive action should be taken against every individual involved in the design, approval, execution, supervision, endorsement, or wilful oversight of these failures. Accountability must flow in both directions along the administrative chain of command, yet it must be firmly grounded in due process, with guilt established solely on the basis of evidence presented in a court of law.

Beyond punitive measures, prevention is equally vital. Competitive bidding should become the standard norm, contractor performance must be traceable across multiple projects, audit recommendations must be accompanied by enforceable deadlines, responsible institutions should be held to clear standards, and high-risk transactions ought to leave transparent, verifiable digital trails. Ethiopia’s ongoing “Governance Modernisation Effort” already integrates key elements such as oversight, accountability, public investment management, and procurement reform. This anti-corruption campaign would do well to build on these foundations, ensuring that preventive mechanisms carry more weight than punitive actions alone.

Tangible evidence of recovery must also be visible. A credible anti-corruption effort requires clarity on several fronts: who approved the disbursement of funds, who certified the quality and completion of work, who authorised final payments, who was negligent in supervisory roles, what exactly was misappropriated or wasted, and what assets or funds have been successfully reclaimed. Individuals found guilty of theft, diversion, or the deliberate misuse of public assets should face substantial legal and financial consequences, including prosecution, removal from office where applicable, and the full recovery of stolen resources.

Ultimately, accountability demands that corruption carry real, material consequences. The most meaningful indicator of progress should not be the number of arrests made or press releases issued, but the recovery of state property and public assets. Ethiopia must shift its focus from generating headlines to delivering genuine accountability–from moving beyond audit findings to taking concrete action, and from budget allocations to the actual provision of functioning public services. Such a shift would not only enhance the effectiveness of this initiative but also help dismantle the entrenched culture of impunity. AS

Editor’s Note: Adan Hussein (PhD) is a humanitarian and development advocate, researcher, trainer, and freelance writer. He is the founder of the Together for Displaced Community Development (Todic) Project and the founder and managing director of the Global Development Consulting Group. He holds a PhD in Educational Policy and Leadership Studies, as well as master’s degrees in Curriculum and Instruction and Migration and Development Studies. The author can be reached at adanlunbag55@gmail.com or adanlunback2020@gmail.com

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Tagged: Ethiopia, Corruption, East Africa

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